It has been alleged that deconstruction, especially the kind associated with Nietzsche and Derrida, threatens the very fabric of Western civilization by undermining the very values that made the monuments and edifices of this civilization possible and that the provenance of this menace is, seemingly, the "elimination" of the subject. Admittedly, Nietzsche's almost monomaniacal onslaught on the widely respected ascetic ideal as a nihilistic ideal and Derrida's equivalent sole emphasis on the signifier (rather than the much revered signified which, for him, is always a transcendental signified) make it less difficult and more tempting to charge the two thinkers with all forms of nihilism.
Nietzsche took the art-truth relation seriously by approaching it playfully, and it is this playful dimension (which encompasses woman and Christianity), missing in Heidegger's exegesis, that intrigues me. My discussion operates within and without the economy of gaiety and gravity. Economy here denotes an ever-open "dialectic" with no tertiary closure; this economy enables Nietzsche and enables me to consider the truth/art or science/art relation both seriously and playfully. Put differently, this economy of gaiety and gravity involves a stylistic plurality which cannot be exclusively identified with either art or science but both; therefore, gravity and gaiety are not synonyms for truth and art or science and art.
In his Preface to the 1886 edition of The Birth, Nietzsche formally identifies his lifelong concern with the relationship between art and science, a relationship he examines by seeing science through the eyes of the artist and seeing art through the eyes of life. Here there is already the suggestion that art and science are "rooted" in life, that they both belong together, and that either can assume the other's being. Art and science emerge as serious modes of life which can play with each other. Therefore, the general economy of gaiety and gravity can be characterized as play. With such play, the traditional notions of truth and art and science as such are seriously and playfully put into question, and all we seem to observe thereafter is chaos or anarchy.
Dread comes when we seriously play with-and-on our grounds of being. Nietzsche's artistic look at science and vitalistic look at art are attempts to resituate this twofold mode of being in this world by stripping it of transcendent presuppositions which govern the dominant traditional perspectives of it.
Science and art owe their allegiance and being to our world, this world, this life.
In Sections 5 and 24 of The Birth, Nietzsche distinguishes between "existence" and "the world": "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified"; "existence and the world seem justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon." But Nietzsche later obliterates this world/existence distinction.
In The Gay Science, he expatiates upon this collapsed dichotomy.
"The whole pose," he says, "of 'man against the world', of a man as a 'world-negating' principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world who in the end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting--the monstrous insipidity of this pose has finally come home to us and we are sick of it." He adds that "we laugh as soon free of it, madness befell him" (Nietzsche 1, 201-3). This statement becomes immediately suspect in light of his earlier statement that "Whoever believes that philosophical thought can dispense with its history by means of a simple proclamation will, without knowing it, be dispensed with by history; he will be struck a blow from which he can never recover, one that will blind him utterly."
In other words, Nietzsche's madness is a punishment for his serious attempt to dispense with history, for during his final creative year (1888), which was, according to Heidegger, the apex of his "overturning" of Platonism, Nietzsche became mad-a blow from which' he never recovered. Heidegger contends that "The History of an Error," which Nietzsche "composed a few days during that final year of creative work," exemplifies Nietzsche's method of reversal.
Nietzsche's "History of an Error" (a section of Twilight of the Idols), is a dense critique of his lifelong "enemies": Platonism and Christianity as basic forms of nihilism.
In this "History" he identifies "woman" as a function of Christian nihilism--a theme which he develops in The Antichrist.
One can call "The History of an Error" the problem of the "Christian woman" in Nietzsche. In other words, Nietzsche's reflections on art constitute a physiological aesthetics because such aesthetics "examines the state of creation and enjoyment" and never the work itself and it is "the 'extreme' aesthetics inasmuch as that state is pursued to the farthest perimeter of the bodily state as such, to what is farthest removed from the spirit, from spirituality of what is created, and from its formalistic lawfulness" although it must be noted that "While the body state as such continues to participate as a condition of the creative process, it is at the same time what in the created thing is to be restrained, overcome, and surpassed" (Nietzsche 1, 129) . So, Heidegger thinks that he has been able to show that Nietzsche makes the mistake of trying to apply immediately the result of a science to philosophy.
Again, his seemingly homo-geneous reading ironically demonstrates the impossibility or futility of such a task, for always implicit in such reading is a heterogeneity which resists any such totalization.
II. Science and the Ascetic Ideal
Art and truth in Nietzsche cannot simply be conflated into a positivistic will to power as Heidegger does.
If Nietzsche can be labeled at all, the label would be "the will to life" or "the will to live" or "the eternal affirmation of life," not "nihilism." Nietzsche is a serious gay scientist, and note that the term "gay" or "gaiety" denotes joyful play. Nietzsche measures life according to the will to live it here in this world; therefore, he cherishes whatever affirms such a life and denigrates whatever negates such a life.
He tells us that gay scientists are "those who not only see the terrifying and questionable character of existence but live it, want to live it."* Art should look at science as the artist would look at it--as a "lie," a life-affirming lie; similarly, we should look at art as life would look at it--as a simulacrum--because, as he puts it, "all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives." Art, in a paradoxical sense, becomes a lie that tells truths while "science" becomes a truth that tells lies. But such art and such science have to penetrate each other perpetually in such a way that they cannot afford to be friends or enemies.
There are many ambiguous and recurring basic functional terms in Nietzsche, and they usually come in twos or have two forms: art and truth (or art and science), good and bad, slave morality and noble morality, man and woman, the overman and the last man, Christianity, nihilism, decadence, life, world, existence, tragedy, beauty, evil, history, philosopher, Dionysian and Apollinian, the will to power, lie, etc. Emerson recalls in "The American Scholar": "All things have two handles" and warns us to "beware of the wrong one."' But in Nietzsche we hardly if ever know which handle is which. Hence interpreting Nietzsche's various ideas centripetally as expressions of any one frozen master term is fraught with danger; in Nietzsche we are almost always standing on precarious grounds.
In order to discuss fruitfully the dreadful arttruth or art-science relation, we may have to reflect on Nietzsche's relation to the ascetic ideal, which, in one sense, ties art, truth, science, woman, and Christianity together. Art, truth, science, and Christianity have forms based on the ascetic ideal, and woman has traditionally been their most effective means of consolidating this ascetic ideal.
In After rejecting scientism and religious dogma, Nietzsche seeks alliance with life-affirming art, contending, "art ... in which precisely the lie is sanctified and the will to deception has a good conscience, is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than is science."* Hence in The Will to Power he describes art as the countermovement to nihilism. He calls Plato "the greatest enemy of art Europe has yet produced" because he instinctively understands the formidableness of art as an opponent of the ascetic ideal. He adds, "Plato versus Homer: that is the complete, the genuine antagonism-there the sincerest advocate of the 'beyond', the great slanderer of life; here the instinctive deifier, the golden nature" (Genealogy, Third Essay, Section 25). This Plato/Homer tension here parallels the Socratism/tragedy tension in The Birth.
In Section 24 of The Third Essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche states parenthetically, "Whoever has the opposite notion, whoever tries, for example, to place philosophy 'on a strictly scientific basis' first needs to stand not only philosophy but truth on its head . . "a certain impoverishment of life is a presupposition of both of them--these affects grown cool, the tempo of life slowed down, dialectics in place of instinct, seriousness imprinted on faces and gestures." He then calls gravity or seriousness "the most unmistakable sign of a labored metabolism, of struggling, laborious life." He points out, in his Preface to the 1886 edition of The Birth, that his dissatisfaction with science made him pose science as a problem and science framed as a problem simply asks for "the meaning of science." Nietzsche is particularly angry with science because he himself is in the business of inquiry, and if science, which he had hitherto regarded as the strong adversary of the ascetic ideal, is beginning to prove otherwise, then it is time he changed strategy. Gaiety and gravity have to play as irreconcilable functions of life.
Science, under the guise of anti-ascetic ideal, is deadly because "it is the most unconscious, involuntary, hidden and subterranean ally." Consequently, "the ascetic has decidedly not been conquered: if anything, it becomes stronger," "more elusive, more spiritual, [and) more captious." What Nietzsche maintains throughout Section 25 of the Genealogy (Third Essay) is that "a transcendent solution to the riddle of existence" devalues or negates or impoverishes' life here on earth and makes existence a beggarly affair.
However, he concedes that It is still a metaphysical faith that underlies our faith in science--and we godless men and anti-metaphysicians, I for] we, too, still derive our flame from the fire ignited by a faith millenia old, the Christian faith, which was also Plato's, that God is truth, that truth is divine (Genealogy, Third Essay, Section 24).
Nietzsche knows that Christianity has helped fundamentally to produce Nietzsche.
He also recognizes Christian marks on the world text, and his struggle to rid Christianity of the ascetic ideal is not an undermining of this indebtedness. What seems to be an issue for Nietzsche is not the destruction of Christianity or Platonism but the development and maintenance of an ongoing strenuous critical attitude toward these priveleged or unduly protected phenomena. Therefore, when he proclaims, "well-nigh two thousand years and not a single new god," he is not seeking to replace Christianity or Platonism with another foundational system with a transcendent presupposition that devalues this world, this life. As Derrida notes, "the political maneuver of cryptography does not consist in in-venting new religions but in making use of the remanence, in 'taking advantage of those . . . already established . . .'"» Nietzsche only wants to transvalue truth in relation to Platonism, Christianity, art, and science in order to prune them of their life-negating or earth-impoverishing transcendent presuppositions. He knows that such a deconstructive task is awesome. "From the moment faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, a new problem ajri_ses: that of the value of truth," he points out. ~He then concludes, "the will to truth requires a critique," that is, "the value of truth must for once be experimentally called into question" (Genealogy, Third Essay, Section 24). A seminal critique is essentially a radical resituation of one's relations to tradition, not the destruction of tradition.
We are always somehow giving in to tradition, but as Derrida notes, that "does not mean that all the ways of giving in to it are of equal pertinence," and he adds, "The quality and fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relation to the history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought."
10
Nietzsche is often aware of this inescapability of logocentrism, but his stylistic hyperbolism and exuberance usually make us lose sight of this awareness. The fact that we cannot totally and permanently escape from tradition does not mean that we should live within it; Nietzsche's styles of gaiety and gravity enable him to live within and without metaphysics, or to live on borderlines, as Derrida would say.
III. Women as Medicine and Poison
Gaiety and gravity involve joyful plays (if by joyful plays we also mean danger and suffering).
Nietzsche tells us in Zarathustra that he "would believe only in a god who could dance |play|," and warns, "not by wrath does one kill but by laughter." He, therefore, invites us to join him in the killing of "the spirit of gravity" (p. 153). Note that he is not against gravity per se but against the spirit, the style, of gravity.
In Section 327 of The Gay Science, under the title of "Taking Seriously," he mocks gravity or any kind of thinking that takes itself too seriously or that promotes or pursues the ascetic ideal.
In Section Art without a transcendent goal becomes a major player in the reading exercises because it recognizes de facto that "The conditions of life might include error" and that "the falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment ....
The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding" (The Gay Science, Section 121). Nietzsche's "fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest judgments (to which synthetic judgments a priori belong) are the most indispensable to us, that without granting as true the fictions of logic, without a continual falsification of the world by means of numbers, mankind could not live--that to renounce false judgments would be to renounce life, would be to deny life" (Beyond Good and Evil, Section 4). It-is in this context that he declares that "Life is no argument" and that art is worth more than truth. Real and ideal (unreal) truths are essential to an affirmation of this world. Art permits perspective which in turn permits the uttering of "truth," even "truth as such." He adds: "we have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live--by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life" (The Gay Science, Section 121).
It is in the above sense that he "argues" that life is no argument. 
IV. Christianity and Woman

